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Abstract
Input gradient regularization is not thought to be an effective means for promoting
adversarial robustness. In this work we revisit this regularization scheme with
some new ingredients. First, we derive new per-image theoretical robustness
bounds based on local gradient information, and curvature information when
available. These bounds strongly motivate input gradient regularization. Second,
we implement a scaleable version of input gradient regularization which avoids
double backpropagation: adversarially robust ImageNet models are trained in 33
hours on four consumer grade GPUs. Finally, we show experimentally that input
gradient regularization is competitive with adversarial training.
1 Introduction
Neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. These are small (imperceptible to the human
eye) perturbations of an image which cause a network to misclassify the image [2, 15, 43]. The
threat posed by adversarial attacks must be addressed before these methods can be deployed in
error-sensitive and security-based applications [31].
Building adversarially robust models is an optimization problem with two objectives: (i) maintain
test accuracy on clean unperturbed images, and (ii) be robust to large adversarial perturbations. The
present state-of-the-art method for adversarial defence, adversarial training [15, 24, 25, 43, 44], in
which models are trained on perturbed images, offers robustness at the expense of test accuracy [45].
It is not clear that multi-step adversarial training is scaleable to large datasets such as ImageNet-1k
[10]. Previous attempts [20, 53] used hundreds of GPUs and took nearly a week to train, although
recent work by Shafahi et al. [40] has offered a remedy.
Assessing the empirical effectiveness of an adversarial defence requires careful testing with multiple
attacks [14]. Furthermore, existing defences are vulnerable to new, stronger attacks: Carlini and
Wagner [5] and Athalye et al. [1] advocate designing specialized attacks to circumvent prior defences,
while Uesato et al. [47] warn against using weak attacks to evaluate robustness. This has led
the community to develop theoretical tools to certify adversarial robustness. Several certification
approaches have been proposed: through linear programming [50, 51] or mixed-integer linear-
programming [52]; semi-definite relaxation [32, 33]; randomized smoothing [8, 23]; or estimates of
the local Lipschitz constant [17, 46, 49]. The latter two approaches have scaled well to ImageNet-1k.
In practice, certifiably robust networks often perform worse than adversarially trained models, which
lack theoretical guarantees. In this article, we work towards bridging the gap between theoretically
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robust networks and empirically effective training methods. Our approach relies on minimizing a
loss regularized against large input gradients
E
(x,y)∼P
[
L(f(x;w), y) + λ
2
‖∇x L(f(x;w), y)‖2∗
]
where ‖ · ‖∗ is dual to the one measuring adversarial attacks (for example the `1 norm for attacks
measured in the `∞ norm). Heuristically, making loss gradients small should make gradient based
attacks more challenging.
Drucker and LeCun [11] implemented gradient regularization using ‘double backpropagation’, which
has been shown to improve model generalization [28]. It has been used to improve the stability of
GANs [27, 36] and to promote learning robust features with contractive auto-encoders [34]. While it
has been proposed for adversarial attacks robustness [17, 19, 35, 37, 42], experimental evidence has
been mixed, in particular, input gradient regularization has so far not been competitive with multi-step
adversarial training.
On non-smooth networks (such as those built of ReLUs) small gradients are no guarantee of adver-
sarial robustness [30], and so it is thought input gradient regularization should not be effective on
non-smooth networks. This raises the question, how often is the lack of smoothness an issue, in
practice? In other words, when do Taylor approximations of the loss fail to predict adversarial robust-
ness, and is smoothness only needed theoretically? The fact that first-order gradient-based attacks
of the loss (like PGD [24]) are usually effective indicates that in many scenarios, non-smoothness
is not an issue. However in a non-negligible minority of cases, attacks based on decision boundary
information [4, 6, 7, 12] outperform gradient based attacks. This indicates the curvature near these
points is large, and first-order information is not sufficient to guarantee robustness. We illustrate this
point in Fig 1. In this work we overcome the limitation of gradient regularization for non-smooth
networks by instead building networks of ‘smooth’ ReLUs. At the expense of a minor drop in test
accuracy, we obtain tighter theoretical lower bounds on robustness, since we can better approximate
the loss using local information.
Another drawback of input gradient regularization is that it is not presently tractable to update
model weights using double backpropagation on large networks. We circumvent this limitation by
differentiating the regularization term without double backpropagation.
Our main contributions are the following. First, we motivate using input gradient regularization of the
loss by deriving new theoretical robustness bounds. These bounds show that small loss gradients and
small curvature are sufficient conditions for adversarial robustness. Second, we empirically show that
input gradient regularization is competitive with adversarial training, even on non-smooth networks, at
a fraction of the training time. Finally, we scale input gradient regularization to ImageNet-1k by using
finite differences to estimate the gradient regularization term, rather than double backpropagation.
This allows us to train adversarially robust networks on ImageNet-1k in 33 hours on four consumer
grade GPUs.
2 Adversarial robustness bounds from the loss
2.1 Background
Much effort has been directed towards determining theoretical lower bounds on the minimum sized
perturbation necessary to perturb an image so that it is misclassified by a model. One promising
approach, proposed by Hein and Andriushchenko [17] and Weng et al. [49], and which has scaled
well to ImageNet-1k, is to use the Lipschitz constant of the model. In this section, we build upon these
ideas: we propose using the Lipschitz constant of a suitable loss, designed to measure classification
errors. In addition, when the loss is twice continuously differentiable, we propose a second-order
bound based on the maximum curvature of the loss.
Our notation is as follows. Write y = f(x;w) for a model which takes input vectors x to label
probabilities, with parameters w. Let L(y1, y2) be the loss and write `(x) := L(f(x,w), y), for the
loss of a model f .
Finding an adversarial perturbation is interpreted as a global minimization problem: find the closest
image to a clean image, in some specified norm, that is is also misclassified by the model
min
v
‖v‖ subject to f(x+ v) misclassified (1)
2
However, (1) is a difficult and costly non-smooth, non-convex optimization problem. Instead,
Goodfellow et al. [15] proposed solving a surrogate problem: find a perturbation v of a clean image x
that maximizes the loss, subject to the condition that the perturbation be inside a norm-ball of radius
δ around the clean image. The surrogate problem is written
max
v
`(x+ v)− c(v); where c(v) =
{
0 if ‖v‖ ≤ δ
∞ otherwise (2)
The hard constraint c(v) forces perturbations to be inside the norm-ball centred at the clean image
x. Ideally, solutions of this surrogate problem (2) will closely align with solutions of the original
more difficult global minimization problem. However, the hard constraint in (2) forces a particular
scale: it may miss attacks which would succeed with only a slightly bigger norm. Additionally, the
maximization problem (2) does not force misclassification, it only asks that the loss be increased.
x x + v
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Figure 1: Illustration of upper bounds
on the loss of two networks. For smooth
networks (blue) with finite curvature, the
loss is bounded above using `(x) and
∇x`(x). Non-smooth networks (orange)
may have jumps in their gradients, which
means robustness is not guaranteed by
small local gradients.
The advantage of (2) is that it may be solved with gradient-
based methods: present best-practice is to use variants
of projected gradient descent (PGD), such as the iterative
fast-signed gradient method [22, 24] when attacks are mea-
sured in the `∞ norm. However, gradient-based methods
are not always effective: on non-smooth networks, such as
those built of ReLU activation functions, a small gradient
does not guarantee that the loss remains small locally. This
deficiency was identified in [29]. See Figure 1: ReLU net-
works may increase rapidly with a very small perturbation,
even when local gradients are small. PGD methods will
fail to locate these worst-case perturbations, and give a
false impression of robustness. Carlini and Wagner [6]
avoid this scenario by incorporating decision boundary in-
formation into the loss; others solve (1) directly [4, 7, 12].
2.2 Derivation of lower bounds
This leads us to consider the following compromise be-
tween (1) and (2). Consider the following modification of
the Carlini and Wagner [6] loss `(x) = maxi 6=c fi(x) −
fc(x), where c is the index of the correct label, and fi(x)
is the model output for the i-th label. This loss has the
appealing property the sign of the loss determines if the
classification is correct. Adversarial attacks are found by
minimizing
min
v
‖v‖ subject to `(x+ v) ≥ `0 (3)
The constant `0 determines when classification is incorrect;
for the modified Carlini-Wagner loss, `0 = 0. Problem (3) is closer to the true problem (1), and will
always find an adversarial image. We use (3) to derive theoretical lower bounds on the minimum
size perturbation necessary to misclassify an image. Suppose the loss is L-Lipschitz with respect to
model input. Then we have the estimate
`(x+ v) ≤ `(x) + L‖v‖ (4)
Now suppose v is adversarial, with minimum adversarial loss `(x+ v) = `0. Then rearranging (4),
we obtain the lower bound ‖v‖ ≥ 1L (`0 − `(x)) .
Unfortunately, the Lipschitz constant is a global quantity, and ignores local gradient information; see
for example Huster et al. [18]. Thus this bound can be quite poor, even when networks have small
Lipschitz constant. On the other hand, if the model is twice continuously differentiable, then the loss
landscape is smoother. This allows us to achieve a tighter bound, using local gradient information, as
illustrated in Figure 1. Let C be an upper bound on the maximum positive eigenvalue of the Hessian
of the loss over all x
C :=
(
max
x
λmax(∇2x `(x))
)+
(5)
3
This value will be estimated empirically by maximizing over the dataset. The constant C is a measure
of the largest positive curvature of the network. Using a Taylor approximation about x, we may upper
bound the perturbed loss with
`(x+ v) ≤ `(x) + 〈v,∇x `(x)〉+ C
2
‖v‖22 (6)
These two bounds give us the following.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose the loss `(x) is Lipschitz continuous with respect to model input x, with
Lipschitz constant L. Let `0 be such that if `(x) < `0, the model is always correct. Then a lower
bound on the minimum magnitude of perturbation v necessary to adversarially perturb an image x is
‖v‖ ≥ max{`0 − `(x), 0}
L
(L-bound)
Suppose in addition that the loss is twice-differentiable, with maximum curvature C (defined as in
(5)). Then
‖v‖2 ≥ 1
C
(
−‖∇ `(x)‖2 +
√
‖∇ `(x)‖22 + 2Cmax {`0 − `(x), 0}
)
(C-bound)
The proof of (L-bound) is given above; the proof of (C-bound) follows by rearranging (6) and solving
for ‖v‖.
Remark 2.2. The second-order bound requires that the network and loss are smooth with respect to
the input, but almost all image classification networks now use ReLUs, which are not smooth. We
use the following smoothed ReLU
σ(x) =
{
max(x, 0) if |x| ≥ 12
− 12
(
x+ 12
)4
+
(
x+ 12
)3
if |x| < 12
This activation function is twice continuously differentiable, and avoids the vanishing gradient
problem of smooth sigmoidal activation functions. Moreover because it agrees with ReLU(x) outside
of the interval (− 12 , 12 ), it is fairly efficient during backpropagation. As for the loss, a smooth version
of the Carlini-Wagner loss is available by using a soft maximum, rather than a strict max.
Proposition 2.1 motivates the need for input gradient regularization. The Lipschitz constant L is the
maximum gradient norm of the loss over all inputs. Therefore (L-bound) says that a regularization
term encouraging small gradients (and so reducing L) should increase the minimum adversarial
distance. This aligns with [17], who proposed the cross-Lipschitz regularizer, penalizing networks
with large Jacobians in order to shrink the Lipschitz constant of the network.
However, this is not enough: the gap `0 − `(x) must be large as well. This explains one form of
‘gradient masking’ [30]. Shrinking the magnitude of gradients while also closing the gap `0 − `(x)
effectively does nothing to improve adversarial robustness. For example, in defense distillation,
the magnitude of the model Jacobian is reduced by increasing the temperature of the final softmax
layer of the network. However, this has the detrimental side-effect of sending the model output to
( 1N , · · · , 1N ), where N is the number of classes, which effectively shrinks the loss gap to zero. Thus
with high distillation temperatures the lower bound provided by Proposition 2.1 approaches zero.
Moreover, even supposing the loss gradients are small and the gap `0−`(x) is large, there may still be
adversarially vulnerable images. For example, suppose we have two smooth networks, one with large
curvature, and another with small curvature. Suppose that there is an image with zero gradient on both
networks, each with identically large loss gaps `0 − `(x). The second-order bound (C-bound) says
that the minimum adversarial distance here is bounded below by ‖v‖ ≥√max{`0 − `(x), 0}/C. In
other words, the network with smaller curvature is more robust.
Taken together, Proposition 2.1 provides three sufficient conditions for training robust networks: (i)
the loss gap `0 − `(x) should be large; (ii) the gradients of the loss should be small; and (iii) the
curvature of the loss should also be small. The first point will be satisfied by default when the loss is
minimized. The second point will be satisfied by training with a loss regularized to penalize large
input gradients. Experimentally the third point is satisfied with input gradient regularization. When
these conditions are satisfied, local information is enough to guarantee robustness.
4
Our robustness bounds are most similar in spirit to Weng et al. [49], who derive bounds using an
estimate of the local Lipschitz constant of the model. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [26] have also used a
second order approximation to derive approximate robustness bounds for binary classification, but
they neglected higher order error terms. Cohen et al. [8] derive bounds by training with normally
distributed input noise, then averaging model predictions normally sampled about the input image. It
is well known that training with normal noise is equivalent to squared `2 norm gradient regularization
[3]; thus Cohen et al. [8] achieve gradient regularization indirectly. Our bounds require at most one
gradient and model evaluation per image once L and C have been estimated; whereas both Cohen
et al. and Weng et al. require many hundreds of local model evaluations per image. Since L and C
are globally estimated, our bounds could be improved using these local sampling techniques to obtain
local values of L and C, with more computational effort.
3 Squared norm gradient regularization
Proposition 2.1 provides strong motivation for input gradient regularization as a method for promoting
adversarial robustness. However, it does not tell us what form the gradient regularization term should
take. In this section, we show how norm squared gradient regularization arises from a quadratic cost.
In adversarial training, solutions of (2) are used to generate images on which the network is trained.
In effect, adversarial training seeks a solution of the minimax problem
min
w
E
x∼P
[
max
v
`(x+ v;w)− c(v)
]
(7)
where P is the distribution of images. This is a robust optimization problem [38, 48]. The cost
function c(v) penalizes perturbed images from being too far from the original. When the cost function
is the hard constraint from (2), perturbations must be inside a norm ball of radius δ. This leads to
adversarial training with PGD [22, 24]. However this forces a particular scale: it is possible that
no images are adversarial within radius δ, but that there are adversarial images with only a slightly
larger distance. Instead of using a hard constraint, we can relax the cost function to be the quadratic
cost c(v) = 12δ‖v‖2. The quadratic cost allows attacks to be of any size, but penalizes larger attacks
more than smaller attacks. With a quadratic cost, there is less of a danger that a local attack will be
overlooked.
Solving (7) directly is expensive: on ImageNet-1k, both Kannan et al. [20] and Xie et al. [53] required
large-scale distributed training with many dozens or hundreds of GPUs, and over a week of training
time. Instead we take the view that (7) may be bounded above, and solved approximately. When the
loss is smooth and c(v) = 12δ‖v‖2, the optimal value of maxv `(x+ v)− c(v) using the bound (6) is
δ
2(1−δC)‖∇x `(x)‖2∗, provided δ < 1C . This gives the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose both the model and the loss are twice continuously differentiable. Suppose
attacks are measured with quadratic cost 12δ‖v‖2. Then the optimal value of (7) is bounded above by
min
w
E
x∼P
[
`(x;w) +
λ
2
‖∇x `(x)‖2∗
]
(8)
where λ = δ1−δC .
That is, we may bound the solution of the adversarial training problem (7) by solving the gradient
regularization problem (8), when the cost function is quadratic. It is not necessary to know δ
or compute C; they are absorbed into λ. In the adversarial robustness literature, input gradient
regularization using the squared `2 norm was proposed by Ross and Doshi-Velez [35]. It was expanded
by Roth et al. [37] to use a Mahalanobis norm with the correlation matrix of adversarial attacks.
When c(v) is the hard constraint forcing attacks inside the δ norm ball and C is small, supposing the
curvature term is negligible, we can estimate the maximum in (7) by `(x) + 1δ ‖∇x `(x)‖∗, using the
dual norm for the gradient. This is norm gradient regularization (not squared), and was recently used
for adversarial robustness on both CIFAR-10 [42], and MNIST [39].
3.1 Finite difference implementation
Norm squared input gradient regularization has long been used as a regularizer in neural networks:
Drucker and LeCun [11] first showed its effectiveness for generalization. Drucker and LeCun
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Figure 2: Adversarial attacks on the CIFAR-10 dataset, on networks built with standard ReLUs.
Regularized networks attacked in `2 are trained with squared `2 norm gradient regularization;
networks attacked in `∞ are trained with squared `1 norm regularization.
implemented gradient regularization with ‘double backpropagation’ to compute the derivatives of
the penalty term with respect to the model parameters w, which is needed to update the parameters
during training. Double backpropagation involves two passes of automatic differentiation: one pass
to compute the gradient of the loss with respect to the inputs x, and another pass on the output of
the first to compute the gradient of the penalty term with respect to model parameters w. In neural
networks, double backpropagation is the standard technique for computing the parameter gradient
of a regularized loss. However, it is not currently scaleable to large neural networks. Instead we
approximate the gradient regularization term with finite differences.
Proposition 3.2 (Finite difference approximation of squared `2 gradient norm). Let d be the normal-
ized input gradient direction: d = ∇x `(x)/‖∇x `(x)‖2 when the gradient is nonzero, and set d = 0
otherwise. Let h be the finite difference step size. Assume further that the loss is twice continuously
differentiable. Then, the squared `2 gradient norm is approximated by
‖∇x `(x)‖22 ≈
(
`(x+ hd)− `(x)
h
)2
(9)
The vector d is normalized to ensure the accuracy of the finite difference approximation, which is of
order h, as can be seen by a Taylor approximation. The finite differences approximation (9) allows the
computation of the gradient of the regularizer (with respect to model parameters w) to be done with
only two regular passes of backpropagation, rather than with double backpropagation. On the first,
the input gradient direction d is calculated. The second computes the gradient with respect to model
parameters by performing backpropagation on the right-hand-side of (9). Double backpropagation
is avoided by detaching d from the computational graph after the first pass. In practice, for large
networks, we have found that the finite difference approximation of the regularization term is
considerably more efficient than using double backpropagation.
The proposed training algorithm, with squared Euclidean input gradient regularization, is presented
in Algorithm 1 of the appendix. Other gradient penalty terms can be approximated as well. For
example, when defending against attacks measured in the `∞ norm, the squared `1 norm penalty can
approximated by setting instead d = sign(∇x `(x))/
√
N when the gradient is nonzero.
4 Experimental results
In this section we provide empirical evidence that input gradient regularization is an effective tool for
promoting adversarial robustness, even on non-smooth networks built with standard ReLU activation
functions.
We train networks on the CIFAR-10 dataset [21], and ImageNet-1k [10]. On the CIFAR dataset we use
the ResNeXt architecture3 [54]; on ImageNet-1k we use a ResNet-50 [16]. The CIFAR networks were
trained with standard data augmentation and learning rate schedules on a single GeForce GTI 1080 Ti.
3ResNeXt34-2x32 on CIFAR-10; ResNeXt34-2x64 on CIFAR-100
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Table 1: Adversarial robustness statistics, measured in the `∞ norm. Top1 error is reported on
CIFAR-10; Top5 error on ImageNet-1k.
smooth
ReLU?
% clean
error
% error at mean
distance
improvement
ratio
training
time (hours)
ε = 2255 ε =
8
255
CIFAR-10
Undefended 4.36 70.82 98.94 6.62e−3 - 2.06
Madry et al (7-step AT) 16.33 22.86 46.025 4.07e−2 1.88 12.10
squared `1 norm, λ = 0.1 6.45 24.92 70.41 2.35e−2 5.31 5.22
squared `1 norm, λ = 1 9.02 18.47 58.69 3.34e−2 3.78 5.15
ImageNet-1k
Undefended 6.94 90.21 98.94 3.94e−3 - 20.30
Undefended X 9.39 82.03 95.42 9.74e−3 4.17 23.46
squared `2 norm, λ = 0.1 7.66 70.56 97.53 7.96e−3 9.83 32.60
squared `2 norm, λ = 0.1 X 9.49 63.23 94.21 1.24e−2 5.84 52.47
squared `2 norm, λ = 1 10.26 52.79 95.93 9.95e−3 3.19 33.87
On ImageNet-1k, we modified the training code of Shaw et al.’s [41] submission to the DAWNBench
competition [9] and train with four GPUs. Training code and trained model weights are available on
GitHub.4
We train an undefended network as a baseline to compare various types of regularization. On CIFAR-
10, networks are trained with squared `2 and squared `1 gradient norm regularization. The former
is appropriate for defending against attacks measured in `2; the latter for attacks measured in `∞.
We set the regularization strength to be either λ = 0.1 or 1; and set finite difference discretization
h = 0.01. We compare each network with the current state-of-the-art form of adversarial training,
with models trained using the hyperparameters in Madry et al. [24] (7-steps of FGSM, `∞ step size
2
255 , projected onto an `∞ ball of radius
8
255 ). On ImageNet-1k we only train adversarially robust
models with squared `2 regularization.
On each dataset, we attack 1000 randomly selected images. We perturb each image with attacks in
both the Euclidean and `∞ norms, with a suite of current state-of-the-art attacks: the Carlini-Wagner
attack [6]; the Boundary attack [4]; the LogBarrier attack [12]; and PGD [24] (in both the `∞ norm
or the `2 norm). The former three attacks are effective at evading gradient masking defences; the
latter is very good at finding images close to the original when gradients are not close to zero. We
record the best adversarial distance on a per image basis, for each norm.
Adversarial robustness results for networks attacked in the `∞ norm are presented in Table 1. These
results are for networks built of standard ReLUs. Table 1 and Figure 2 demonstrate a clear trade-off
between test accuracy and adversarial robustness, as the strength of the regularization is increased.
On CIFAR-10, the undefended network achieves test error of 4.36%, but is not robust to attacks even
at `∞ distance 2255 . However with a strong regularization parameter (λ = 1), test error increases to
9.02% on clean images, and only 18.47% test error at attack distance 2255 . In contrast, the network
trained with 7-steps of adversarial training appears to be over-regularized: on clean images, the
adversarially trained network achieves 16.33% test error, but 22.86% error at distance 2255 . To be fair,
at the commonly reported `∞ of 8255 , the adversarially trained network outperforms the best gradient
regularized networks by about 12%, but at over twice the training time of the regularized networks.
On ImageNet, we see a reduction of nearly 40% at distance 2255 .
It has been noted that adversarial robustness comes with a cost of degraded test error [45]. This trade-
off may be quantified. We measure the relative improvement in adversarial robustness against the
cost of degraded test error with the following metric. Suppose an undefended network has test error
e0, and let a regularized network’s network test error be denoted eλ. Define the relative degradation
in test error to be Re = (eλ − e0)/e0. Similarly define the relative improvement in robustness
(measured by mean adversarial distance µ) to be Rµ = (µλ − µ0)/µ0. We define the adversarial
improvement ratio to be Rµ/Re. This measures the improvement in adversarial robustness against
4https://github.com/cfinlay/tulip
5Madry et al report 54.2% error at ε = 8
255
with the WRN-28x10 architecture; our results are obtained with
ResNeXt34 (2x32).
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Table 2: Adversarial robustness statistics, measured in `2. Top1 error is reported on CIFAR-10; Top5
error on ImageNet-1k.
smooth
ReLU?
% clean
error
mean adversarial distance improve-
ment
ratio
training
time
(hours)L-bound C-bound empirical
CIFAR-10
Undefended 4.36 5.57e−3 - 0.12 - 2.06
Undefended X 6.84 1.01e−2 1.19e−2 0.11 −0.20 3.78
Madry et al (7-step AT) 16.33 0.18 - 0.74 1.81 12.10
squared `2 norm, λ = 0.1 8.03 0.14 - 0.63 4.86 5.18
squared `2 norm, λ = 0.1 X 11.68 0.13 0.17 0.59 2.25 9.46
squared `2 norm, λ = 1 20.31 0.30 - 0.81 1.52 5.08
ImageNet-1k
Undefended 6.94 3.63e−2 - 0.55 - 20.30
Undefended X 9.39 2.56e−2 3.40e−2 0.56 0.12 23.46
squared `2 norm, λ = 0.1 7.66 0.13 - 1.14 10.23 32.60
squared `2 norm, λ = 0.1 X 9.49 9.23e−2 7.52e−2 1.09 2.64 52.47
squared `2 norm, λ = 1 10.26 0.26 - 1.75 4.52 33.87
the expense of poorer test error: high values mean the defended model is much more robust and has
not lost significant test accuracy. Values close to zero imply the model is more robust but has a much
worse test accuracy relative to the undefended model. The improvement ratio is non-dimensional,
and so it allows for comparison between datasets.
Measured in this metric, the tradeoff between test accuracy and adversarial robustness is clear. On
both ImageNet-1k and CIFAR-10, models regularized with λ = 0.1 offer the best trade-off between
robustness and test error. If test accuracy is not of foremost concern, then stronger regularization
parameters may be chosen. If neither training time nor test accuracy are important factors, then
adversarial training is competitive with gradient regularization.
In Table 2 we report results on models trained for attacks in the `2 norm. On CIFAR-10, the most
robust model is trained with regularization strength λ = 1, and outperforms even the adversarially
trained model. On ImageNet-1k, we see the same pattern: the model trained with λ = 1 offers the
best protection against adversarial attacks. Due to the long training time, we were not able to train
ImageNet-1k with multi-step adversarial training.
In Table 2 we also report our theoretical bounds on the minimum distance required to adversarially
perturb, using the Carlini-Wagner loss.6 Figures 4 and 5 of the appendix show these bounds on a
per-image basis. The theoretical bounds require calculating constants L and C, which are not readily
available. Instead, we estimate L as the maximum gradient norm over test images; for smooth models
we estimate C as the maximum spectral norm of the Hessian.7 These estimates are reported in Table
3 of the appendix. Gradient regularization reduces L and C, by one to two orders of magnitude.
Table 3 shows adversarial training also reduces L: effectively adversarial training is a regularizer.
Because L and C are estimated, and not exact, one would expect that our bounds would sometimes
fail. However, on CIFAR-10, the bounds reliable held on all attacked images. On ImageNet-1k, the
bounds failed on about 9% of attacked test images, which indicates that C and L could be estimated
more accurately, for example using by estimating these constants locally like in [49].
5 Conclusion
We have provided motivation for training adversarially robust networks through input gradient
regularization, by bounding the minimum adversarial distance with gradient and curvature statistics
of the loss. We have shown empirically that gradient regularization is scaleable to ImageNet-1k, and
provides adversarial robustness competitive with adversarial training. We gave theoretical per-image
bounds on the minimum adversarial distance, for non-smooth models (using the Lipschitz constant of
6This loss can be modified for Top-5 mis-classification as well.
7We compute the spectral norm of the Hessian using the Lanczos algorithm [13, §10.1] on Hessian-vector
products (computed via automatic differentiation).
8
the loss), and augmented these bounds using smooth models with a second-order bound based on
model curvature. These bounds were empirically validated against state-of-the-art attacks.
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A Additional methods and results
Algorithm 1 Training with squared `2-norm input gradient regularization, using finite differences
1: Input: Initial model parameters w0
Hyperparameters: Regularization strength λ; batch size m; finite difference discretization h
2: while wt not converged do
3: sample minibatch of data
{
(x(i), y(i))
}
i=1,...,m
from empirical distribution Pˆ
4: for i = 0 tom do
5: g(i) = ∇x`(x(i), y(i);wt)
6: d(i) =
{
g(i)
‖g(i)‖2 if g
(i) 6= 0
0 otherwise
. for `1-norm use normalized signed gradient
7: detach d(i) from computational graph
8: z(i) = x(i) + hd(i)
9: end for
10: L(w) = 1m
∑m
i=1 `(x
(i), y(i);w)
11: R(w) = 1m
∑m
i=1
1
h2
(
`(z(i), y(i);w)− `(x(i), y(i);w))2
12: wt+1 ← wt − τt∇w (L(wt) + λR(wt))
13: end while
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Figure 3: Adversarial attacks on ImageNet-1k with the ResNet-50 architecture. Top5 error reported.
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Figure 4: Theoretical minimum lower bound on adversarial distance for CIFAR-10, on networks with
smooth ReLU activation functions. Defended networks trained with λ = 0.1, penalized with squared
`2 norm gradient.
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Figure 5: Theoretical minimum lower bound on adversarial distance for ImageNet-1k, on networks
with smooth ReLU activation functions. Defended networks trained with λ = 0.1, penalized with
squared `2 norm gradient.
Table 3: Regularity statistics on selected models, measured in the `2 norm. Statistics computed using
modified loss maxi 6=c fi(x)− fc(x) . A soft maximum is used for curvature statistics.
soft
ReLU?
mean maximum
‖∇ `(x)‖ ‖∇2`(x)‖ ‖∇ `(x)‖ ‖∇2`(x)‖
CIFAR-10
Undefended 3.05 - 122.34 -
Undefended X 3.25 198.23 65.35 8134.26
Madry et al (7-step AT) 0.40 - 2.52 -
squared `2 norm, λ = 0.1 0.58 - 4.43 -
squared `2 norm, λ = 0.1 X 0.65 2.08 4.52 27.05
squared `2 norm, λ = 1 0.35 - 1.33 -
ImageNet-1k
Undefended 1.12 - 17.51 -
Undefended X 1.02 11.61 25.43 848.69
squared `2 norm, λ = 0.1 0.46 - 4.85 -
squared `2 norm, λ = 0.1 X 0.45 1.87 6.99 171.98
squared `2 norm, λ = 1 0.27 - 2.12 -
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